History demonstrates that populism is fuelled not only by the desire to defend national identity but also from economical insecurity. This means that it can be fought through redistribution and social policies which compensate for the negative effects of new technologies on employment.

This talk will argue that the foundations of institutions that protect individual liberty and create an environment conducive to economic growth are not in clever institutional designs or top-down development of state institutions. Rather, they emerge from the involvement of society in politics in a way that balances the power of state institutions and elites. This precarious balance, when it is achieved, unleashes a powerful process of building of state capacity and development of society's capability to institutionalize its involvement in politics. The corridor leading to such institutions is narrow because of the difficulty of creating this balance and staying the course despite myriad conflicts and gridlocks.

We study preferences for protectionism in response to unemployment resulting from different types of labor market shocks. These include technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.

The specter of populism is haunting the world. But what is it exactly? Where does it come from and what should be done about it? We define populism as an anti-elitist exclusionary political strategy which builds a coalition of discontented citizens to challenge the status-quo. To understand why this coalition is potentially destabilizing to democracy and how it forms we developed a framework to studying the joint evolution of state and society.

This lecture assesses what has so far been accomplished in terms of decarbonisation and energy efficiency improvements and compares this to what will be needed to prevent further warming of the earth about 2 degrees C. The structural transformation required to reduce carbon emissions in line with the IPCC target is profound, and, as will be argued, cannot be left to markets, private initiative and/or pecuniary nudges. A green industrial policy might accomplish this, but it will have to overcome powerful tendencies towards dual economies in the world's most advanced economies.

Globalization has been blamed in the last thirty years for many economic ills, including the rise of inequality. I will discuss the findings of a large body of work on the impact of globalization on inequality. Research does not confirm many popular views.

There are profound reasons why the public misunderstands economics in predictable ways, rooted in the mismatch between our human cognitive endowment and economic analysis. This impacts public policy everywhere, but especially when populists control the economy, as their self-presentation as one with “the people” compels them to embrace simplistic views that resonate with those of the lay public.

The political landscape in Europe has changed dramatically over the recent years. In many countries, right-wing parties have strongly increased their vote shares, often at the expense of social democrats. To which extent is this driven by globalization – in particular, by the extent and composition of recent immigrant flows, and by exposure to international trade and shrinking manufacturing sectors? I discuss arguments put forth in the recent literature and present results from own research that sheds light on these and related issues.

Politics in the early 21st is characterized by the rise of populism, in which “the people” are pitted against “the elite,” but what explains the rise of populist parties and what are the consequences of populist politics?

How does one's' political-economic environment shape aspirations and choices? Decisions are generally made within a specific set of social norms, rules, values and world views. We study how, during the German Reunification, convergence with West Germany influenced the educational aspirations and eventual educational investments of students in the East.

Over the last 65 years there has been a large rise in the share of Muslims in the world population and a decline in the share of Christians, but the big story is not one about the former growing at the expense of the latter, since the movement in their relative shares reflects almost entirely the different demographics of the populations in which the two religions were more strongly implanted at the beginning of the postwar era. Instead, the story is about local and folk religions all over the world being replaced by organisations representing one of the two major global religious identities. This lecture will look at how religions compete with each other in the global and local marketplaces.

Populist foreign policies pursued recently by President Trump, British Brexiteers, and leaders of other European democracies have produced surprisingly little real policy change. Populist rhetoric generally proves to be incompatible with pursuit of the national interest in a globalized world. On most issues, populist governments choose to break their foreign policy promises in order to stay in office.

All over Europe, the populist right has taken hold through some shared ideas, such as the rejection of immigrants and of the free circulation of goods and assets, and the opposition to supranational institutions. The consequence of their success, though, may be very different in each country, depending on the steadiness of their liberal and democratic systems. The question arises whether a threat to democracy can be transformed in a democratic corrective.

The unemployment figures hide dramatic statistics regarding underemployment, underpaid work and jobs of a few hours. Young people and the less educated are increasingly underemployed, while immigrants are erroneously blamed for this worsening in the quality of work. What can be done to change this situation?

The behaviour of people changes, albeit slowly, over the course of time and is very different in different countries. Consider the role of women and their relationship with employment and fertility, or the commitment made to work, the way of responding to the law or respect for the environment. To what extent can economics explain these differences in behaviour and to what extent is it instead necessary to involve something else, namely what we call culture?

Given the diffusion of the web, today it is very easy to acquire information about the economy of a country or a particular problem at no charge, or almost. However, there is simply too much information on the internet and searching for it with care, selecting the data which is really relevant, takes time, which represents money. The future of the web is in collecting information, filtering the great mass available and selecting the few things which are really relevant.

In almost all developed economies there has been an increasing presence of mothers in the employment market, including those with young children. This leads to a higher level of family income, part of which can be spent on the children, but also less time available. What is the result of these changes? How does the greater availability of consumer goods and the lesser time spent with children influence the human capital of children?

The public policies necessary to support growth change depending on the distance from the technological frontier. The policy on competitiveness and public support for investment in human capital are more important when one is closer to the technological frontier, whereas macroeconomic policy (monetary and fiscal), designed to reduce cyclical fluctuation, is more important in countries with financial markets which are little developed.

A long tradition of thinking links economic wellbeing to serious moral consequences: from individualism to exploitation of the work of others and disintegration of traditional social bonds. This is not the case: economic history and studies show that economic development makes a society more open, tolerant and democratic. It is not by chance that episodes of intolerance have always followed years of economic gloom.

How can one best protect the voting rights of shareholders? Why are there so many listed companies with different types of shares in Europe? Is this a good thing?

Important politicians and commentators believe that at the root of terrorism there is poverty and a lack of education. In truth many terrorists come from the middle classes and are well educated. So who are the terrorists, what are they thinking and what motivates them?

Recent studies show that the level of redistribution of public wealth is lower in societies characterised by many ethnic differences as compared to more homogeneous societies. The use of economic models for political choice can explain this phenomenon and help us to understand whether the roots are mainly social, economic or political.

Even in a democracy such as America, a powerful electorate has created inefficient economic institutions, responsible for slowing down growth. It would therefore seem that democracy is not a cure-all for the problem of underdevelopment, above all when there are enormous differences of interests.

Whereas a market economy may be compatible with the absence of democracy, experience of socialism has shown that there cannot be democracy without a market economy. The experience of transition teaches us that the development of a market economy does not necessarily promote democracy.
So what could be the keystone for democratic development in Eastern European countries and in China?